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In a recent interview with PRENSA LATINA broadcast on March 11, Sandinista military intelligence
chief Captain Ricardo Wheelock, the conflict among contra leaders with the United Nicaraguan
Opposition (UNO) may exert influence on the US Congress, but will have no discernible effect on
FDN (Nicaraguan Democratic Force, the main contra army based in Honduras) military actions.
Wheelock explained his comment by asserting that the FDN is US-directed and controlled, making
UNO conflicts relatively unimportant. He added that the United States has provided the FDN
with food, weapons, clothing and training, regardless of opinions and votes by the US Congress.
According to the intelligence officer, the attempt to unite the diverse contra groups within UNO is
doomed to failure, because the person heading the largest military force, Enrique Bermudez, is a
former colonel of the Somoza regime. He pointed out that "moderate" UNO leaders Alfonso Robelo
and Arturo Cruz have no troops under their direction. Wheelock then mentioned that Bermudez is
well aware of his relative power: in a recent interview with reporters, the contra military leader said
it was he who has the weapons, and thus the power, in the contra movement. Wheelock said that
evidence emerging from investigations of the US Congress and the Tower Commission report on
the Iran- contragate scandal indicate the contras have participated in international drug trafficking,
and that contra ranks are "filled with thieves and the `scum' of several countries." Moreover, he
said, it is clear the CIA has assisted the contras in their various illegal activities. Next, the captain
declared that the CIA is trying to transform the FDN into a "national liberation army," an effort
which will sorely test FDN capabilities. It should not be forgotten, he said, that US supplies and
intelligence information continue to "pour in" for the contras' benefit. Wheelock then referred to a
report appearing in a recent quarterly publication of the Heritage Foundation, titled, "The Road to
Managua." This report, he said, indicates that the contras intend to use the same strategy employed
by the FSLN (Sandinista National Liberation Front) to overthrow the Somoza dictatorship. The
strategy, however, is being developed in a "mechanistic" fashion, since its authors are ignoring an
important element the FSLN relied on, i.e., a large popular base of support among the Nicaraguan
people. He said another important point appearing in the Foundation report was the two-year long
attempt by the contras to take control of the Rama-Juigalpa highway, which links the Atlantic coast
with Managua and towns on the Pacific coast. Although the contras have tried to concentrate their
efforts in areas along the highway, the Sandinista armed forces "have not given them the chance
to do so." Press accounts, said Wheelock, have exaggerated the importance of the presence of an
estimated 2,000 contras in the fifth military region which the highway passes through. He declared
that "one must bear in mind that this region consisting of Boaco, Chontales, Rio San Juan, and
a portion of Zelaya departments is twice the size of El Salvador. Transportation networks in the
region are quite underdeveloped, it is sparsely populated, and is partially covered by jungle. The
presence of contra troops in the fifth military region, said Wheelock, is relatively inconsequential.
The FDN has no hope of "taking control over Bluefields or Puerto Cabezas, or even Corn Island.
Even if they could take control of a portion of the highway for a few minutes or hours, they would
be immediately defeated." Wheelock asserted that the contras pose no real strategic threat to the
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revolution. "We have deprived them of their social base, considerably reduced their troop strength,
and their complete annihilation is only a matter of time." It is not possible to say exactly when the
contras will be eliminated, he added, because the continuity and content of US aid is an unknown
quantity. The intelligence officer then mentioned that the contra airlift supply operation is directed
exclusively by the CIA, from the Aguacate and Ilopango airbases in Honduras and El Salvador,
respectively. He said the Aguacate airbase is the contras' principal supply depot: from this point, US
Army C-47 helicopters supply FDN troops located in Nicaragua close to the Honduran border.

-- End --
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